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I. INTRODUCTION 
In re Annandale1 presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with 
a particularly complex administrative law issue: Should a state high 
court defer to a state administrative agency’s interpretation of an 
       †  Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  Portions of 
this article are based on a piece written for the Minnesota Bar Association Public 
Law Section newsletter.  I want to thank my research assistant, Rachel E. Bendtsen 
(Class of 2008), for her able research and revisions to an earlier draft, Professor 
David Schultz for his comments on an earlier draft, and Professor Richard Murphy 
for his feedback on Figure 1. 
 1. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007). 
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ambiguous federal regulation that the state agency administers?2  
Or should it decide that such interpretive questions are too far 
removed from the rationales behind agency deference and are 
therefore more appropriately resolved directly by the courts?3  In 
concluding that deference was appropriate, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court followed a century-old pattern of bolstering its own 
agency deference analysis with citations to purportedly analogous 
federal case law.4 
This consistent reliance on federal cases has been helpful to 
practitioners because it opened up a vast reserve of persuasive 
authority on these often difficult issues.  Close examination of the 
Annandale court’s analysis, however, raises questions about the 
continued viability of that practice.  In particular, Annandale’s 
analysis differs from federal agency deference doctrine in at least 
three significant ways.  First, Annandale authorizes strong deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that the 
agency administers but did not author, a result at odds with federal 
case law.  Second, unlike federal case law, the court’s discussion of 
agency deference in Annandale does not clearly distinguish between 
agency deference problems involving ambiguous statutes and those 
involving ambiguous regulations.  Third, and closely related to the 
second point, the court identifies separation of powers as the 
common theoretical justification for deference to agency 
interpretation of both statutes and regulations—an approach that, 
again, contrasts with the federal approach. 
This article explores each of these differences between 
Annandale’s view of deference and comparable federal authority.  
Part II begins the discussion with an explanation of the somewhat 
complicated legal and factual background that gave rise to 
 2. Id. at 505. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 512 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).  See also 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984); St. Otto’s Home v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40 
(Minn. 1989) (citing Udall, 380 U.S. at 16); Resident v. Noot, 305 N.W.2d 311, 312 
(Minn. 1981) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969)); Knopp 
v. Gutterman, 258 Minn. 33, 39–41, 102 N.W.2d 689, 695–96 (Minn. 1960) (citing 
Durkee-Atwood Co. v. Willcuts, 83 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1936)); In re Abbot’s Estate, 
213 Minn. 289, 295, 6 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn. 1942) (citing Red Wing Malting 
Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1926)); Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Wallace, 197 
Minn. 216, 227, 266 N.W. 690, 696 (Minn. 1936) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821)); State v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 43, 45, 103 
N.W. 731, 732 (Minn. 1905) (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264). 
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Annandale’s unusually thorny agency deference issues.5  This 
section includes an extended discussion of the Annandale 
administrative record and the reasoning of the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals and Minnesota Supreme Court.6  Part III then critically 
analyzes the Annandale court’s claims to have acted consistently 
with federal agency deference case law in each of the three areas 
discussed above.7  Part IV concludes with some post-Annandale 
developments and practical observations for Minnesota 
administrative law practitioners.8 
II. THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Legal Background 
Like many landmark administrative law cases, Annandale is also 
an environmental law case.9  This particular dispute involved the 
confluence of two aspects of the Clean Water Act (CWA).10  The 
first is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES), which requires permits for specific “point-source” 
discharges of water pollution affecting “waters of the United 
States”—meaning navigable waters, interstate water bodies, and 
intrastate water bodies used for purposes of interstate commerce 
such as recreation and fishing.11  Although the permit obligation is 
federal, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may delegate 
its permitting authority to qualifying states.12  In addition to 
discharge or “effluent” conditions, NPDES permits typically contain 
requirements governing monitoring, reporting, and other 
matters.13 
The other relevant legal regime is the CWA’s state water 
quality standards requirement.  In contrast to the NPDES regime’s 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV.  A caveat at the outset: the Annandale case involves many 
issues of both environmental and administrative law.  This article does not aim to 
address all of them.  Instead, it is narrowly focused, as identified above. 
 9. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984); Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977). 
 10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). 
 11. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 12. Id. § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
 13. CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 312 (19th 
ed. 2007). 
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focus on regulating specifically identified pollution sources, the 
state water quality standards regime focuses on establishing the 
appropriate uses and condition of waters subject to the CWA.14  To 
use an example, a state may determine that in streams whose 
designated uses include trout propagation, arsenic levels may not 
exceed 0.2 milligrams per liter.15  If a stream does not meet this 
standard, it is designated as “impaired,” and the state is further 
obligated to scientifically determine how much arsenic the stream 
could absorb (plus a safety margin) and still comply with water 
quality standards.  The process of calculating this “Total Maximum 
Daily Load” (TMDL) of arsenic includes cataloging all of the 
arsenic sources affecting the stream.16 
A federal regulation promulgated by the EPA, 40 C.F.R. § 
122.4(i), connects the NPDES and water quality standards.17  
Because this regulation is central to the interpretive issue in 
Annandale, it is worth quoting at length: 
No permit may be issued . . . [t]o a new source or a new 
discharger, if the discharge from its construction or 
operation will cause or contribute to the violation of water 
quality standards.  The owner or operator of a new source 
or new discharger proposing to discharge into a water 
segment which does not meet applicable water quality 
standards or is not expected to meet those standards even 
after the application of the effluent limitations required 
by [law], and for which the State or interstate agency has 
performed a [TMDL] allocation for the pollutant to be 
discharged, must demonstrate, before the close of the 
public comment period, that: 
(1) There are sufficient remaining pollutant load 
allocations to allow for the discharge; and 
(2) The existing dischargers into that segment are 
subject to compliance schedules designed to bring 
the segment into compliance with applicable water 
quality standards.18 
The meaning of the phrase “cause or contribute” would 
become the major focus of the state permitting action and the 
subsequent litigation. 
 14. Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. 1313(c) (2000). 
 15. BELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 320. 
 16. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). 
 17. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (1996). 
 18. Id. (emphasis added). 
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B. The Annandale/Maple Lake Wastewater Treatment Plant Proposal 
and Administrative Record 
In 2003, the cities of Annandale and Maple Lake in Wright 
County, Minnesota, proposed to build a new, shared wastewater 
treatment plant to replace their existing facilities.19  The cities’ 
existing facilities were more than forty years old, and the 
anticipated rapid population growth in Wright County, on the edge 
of the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area, was expected to 
quickly outstrip the capacity of the old plants.20 
The cities’ proposed facility would discharge pollutants 
including phosphorus into waters that eventually feed Lake Pepin, 
125 miles away on the Mississippi River.21  In 2002, the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) had  determined that Lake 
Pepin was “impaired” under the state’s CWA water quality 
standards, although it had not yet calculated TMDLs for the lake.22  
In particular, Lake Pepin suffered from too much phosphorus, 
which feeds algae blooms that can deplete oxygen levels and affect 
water clarity.23  Now the cities were requesting an NPDES permit for 
a new facility that would discharge 2200 additional pounds of 
phosphorus into the Lake Pepin watershed.24 
The MPCA recognized that the federal regulation barring any 
permits to new dischargers that “cause or contribute” to water 
quality violations was going to be a concern for the 
Annandale/Maple Lake proposal.  A March 31, 2004 draft memo 
in the administrative record, entitled “NPDES Permits and 
Impaired Waters,” pointedly frames the legal issue—how to deal 
with the word “contribute” in the federal regulation: 
Issue: 40 C.F.R. [§] 122.4(i) states that “No permit may be 
issued to a new source or new discharger, if the discharge 
from its construction or operation will cause or contribute 
to the violation of water quality standards.”25 
 
 19. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. 2007). 
 20. Id. at 506. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 506, 510–11. 
 23. Id. at 510 n.6. 
 24. Id. at 507. 
 25. Annandale Administrative Record at 385, In re Cities of Annandale & 
Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated 
Wastewater, No. A04-2033 (Minn. May 17, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Administrative Record]. 
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The memo goes on to observe, “[n]ew dischargers of 
phosphorus above Lake Pepin will contribute phosphorus to the 
cumulative load of phosphorus causing the water quality standard 
violation in Lake Pepin,” and asks, “[h]ow can we continue to issue 
NPDES permits to new discharges of phosphorus above Lake Pepin 
and comply with federal law?”26 
From the outset—at least according to the picture painted by 
the administrative record—the answer to that question would 
involve implementing some kind of phosphorus trading system that 
would use reduced discharges in some places to offset increased 
discharges in others.  One of the first mentions of this approach in 
the record is in a February 2004 draft by an internal MPCA group 
called the “Lake Pepin Trading Group” that was tasked with 
“develop[ing] a policy and framework that ensures issuance of 
NPDES wastewater permits that are compliant with . . . 40 C.F.R. § 
122.4(i).”27  The draft described several different phosphorus 
trading schemes, and recommended one called the “Aggregate 
Phosphorus Bank” to track “cumulative credits (phosphorus 
reductions)” and “cumulative debits from new or expanded 
facilities resulting in phosphorus load increases.”28  The draft 
suggested that this phosphorus bank solution would be “a 
temporary system, a bridge” until TMDLs were calculated, and it 
recommended that this apply only to Lake Pepin.29 
Curiously, this draft recommendation includes the word 
processing traces of a reviewer’s comments and suggested revisions.  
Some are intriguing.  For example, the reviewer suggests that the 
phrase “prohibition found in 40 CFR § 122.4(i) which prohibits a 
new discharge that will cause or contribute to the violation of water 
quality standards[,]” be revised to read: “requirement found in 40 
CFR § 122.4(i) which prohibits a new discharge that will cause or 
contribute to the violation of water quality standards . . . .”30 
Another suggested revision would have changed the phrase 
“increases in phosphorus loadings located upstream of Lake Pepin” 
to “changes in phosphorus loadings located upstream of Lake 
Pepin.”31  The reviewer also recommended deleting the original 
 26. Id. at 385. 
 27. Id. at 326. 
 28. Id. at 327. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 326 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. (emphasis added). 
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author’s evocative (albeit parenthetical) nickname for the 
Aggregate Phosphorus Bank: (“spreadsheet in the sky”).32  Also, 
where the draft criticized another form of trading known as 
“permit specific point/point trading” as being too “reactive, 
repetitive, time consuming,” the commenter wrote, “[t]his may 
slant negatively the need to do point[/]point trading in other 
instances, we may need to tone this [down] a little.”33 
In any case, the draft confidently predicted that the “size of the 
credit account on January 1, 2005, should be sufficient to draw 
upon until the completion of the TMDL.”34  The draft doesn’t 
explain the basis for this confidence in the size of the “credit 
account” eleven months down the road (which may be what led our 
reviewer to note, “[n]ot sure I get this part”).35  Nevertheless, the 
administrative record depicts MPCA officials focused in the spring 
and early summer on resolving the 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) issue 
through a phosphorus trading policy that viewed the entire Lake 
Pepin watershed as the source of pollution creditors and debtors. 
Still, some officials discussed the point/point trading approach 
criticized by the Lake Pepin Trading Group, in which “one 
discharger offsets the load of another,”36 and it was in these 
discussions that questions were explicitly raised about whether the 
agency had the legal authority to implement phosphorus trading.  
A March 2004 memo discussing the point/point trading model 
suggested that “MPCA staff and the Attorney General staff should 
investigate if there exists current authority for these mechanisms to 
be in place or if a state rule needs to be promulgated to begin this 
process.”37  The record also reflects some anxiety about the non-
legal considerations confronting the agency as it wrestled over the 
permit application and the issue of the federal regulation.  An e-
mail dated April 29, 2004, entitled “Held up permits,” frets that, if 
the Annandale/Maple Lake NPDES permit application and others 
affected by the impaired waters question were not quickly resolved, 
“things will go political pretty soon.”38 
Late in the summer of 2004, MPCA staff were forced to focus 
on a different problem.  On August 18, 2004, the Minnesota Center 
 32. Id. at 327. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 328. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 420–24. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 496. 
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for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) submitted a comment letter 
on the proposed Annandale/Maple Lake permit.39  The letter 
noted that Lake Pepin was not the only impaired water potentially 
affected by the project: the proposed project would discharge first 
into the North Fork of the Crow River, which the MCEA pointed 
out had been listed as “impaired by low dissolved oxygen 16 miles 
downstream from the proposed facility,” a condition that MCEA 
argued was attributable in part to high phosphorus levels.40  In a 
stroke, the idea of drawing upon the broad reservoir of potential 
phosphorus “credits” apparently contained in the “spreadsheet in 
the sky” to offset the “debits” arising from the proposed 
Annandale/Maple Lake facility seemed to evaporate.  While the 
MPCA was focused on Lake Pepin, 125 miles away, MCEA was 
pointing to impairment much closer to the proposed 
Annandale/Maple Lake project, where there were fewer potential 
phosphorus creditors and debtors among whom a trading 
arrangement might be worked out. 
MCEA’s letter appears to have jarred some MPCA officials.  
One wrote in an e-mail that two colleagues were prepared to testify 
that the proposed Annandale/Maple Lake project should have to 
“trade its phosphorus load down to zero” unless a net decrease in 
phosphorus loading of the Crow River could somehow be 
demonstrated.41  The official argued that MPCA would have “to 
show MCEA a ‘bubble concept’ for the North Fork of the Crow 
watershed,” meaning some kind of demonstration that net 
discharges of phosphorus from Annandale/Maple Lake and other 
dischargers into the North Fork of the Crow would be reduced, 
even if Annandale/Maple Lake itself represented an increase.42  
The official concluded, “[i]f we cannot show an overall decrease in 
phosphorus loading for the watershed, I think we have a 
problem.”43 
MPCA found its solution to that problem in a permit that it 
had approved three years earlier to upgrade the wastewater 
treatment facility in the Meeker County community of Litchfield, 
 39. Id. at 1071–74. 
 40. Id. at 1071. 
 41. Id. at 957. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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about twenty-five miles to the east of Annandale.44  Like the 
proposed Annandale/Maple Lake facility, Litchfield’s discharges 
flowed to the North Fork of the Crow River, in Litchfield’s case via 
a tributary known as Jewitts Creek.45 
For nearly a decade, the Litchfield facility had been operating 
under variances from three state water quality standards (none 
directly regulating phosphorus) granted by MPCA officials.46  The 
city had requested these variances in 1991, based on claims that the 
cost of full compliance would “cause an unnecessary burden on the 
residents and businesses in Litchfield.” 47  The city had also asserted 
that the variances would “not harm the downstream reaches of 
[Jewitts C]reek, or the North Fork of the Crow River.”48  Ten years 
later, Litchfield went back before the MPCA to propose an 
expansion of its facility, and in July 2001 the agency approved the 
expansion, which included improvements that were expected to 
yield an approximately 40,000 to 50,000 pound annual reduction in 
phosphorus discharges into Jewitts Creek.49 
MPCA officials, confronted by MCEA’s arguments on the 
Annandale/Maple Lake project in September 2004, realized that 
they could use Litchfield’s massive phosphorus reductions, which 
the record suggests had started taking effect in April 2004,50 could 
serve as phosphorus credits not only for Lake Pepin, but also for 
the North Fork of the Crow River.  Of course, all of this assumed 
that using one facility’s improvements to offset another facility’s 
increased discharges was consistent with the federal regulation’s 
prohibition on new sources that “cause or contribute” to water 
quality violations.  Still, MPCA officials were pleased with this 
solution to MCEA’s challenge.51 
 44. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination Sys. (NPDES) and State Disposal Sys. (SDS) Permit MN 
0023973 (issued July 20, 2001, expiring June 30, 2006) (copy on file with author). 
 45. Letter from Mayor Ron Ebnet, Litchfield, Minnesota, to Gregory S. Gross, 
Division of Water Quality, MPCA (Aug. 12, 1991) (copy on file with author) 
[hereinafter Ebnet Letter 1].  “Jewitts” is also spelled Jewitt, Jewett, or Jewetts.  Id. 
 46. Letter from Gbolahan Gbadamosi, MPCA, to Kelly Garvey and Joellen 
Rumley, MPCA (Apr. 10, 2001) (copy on file with author). 
 47. Letter from Mayor Ron Ebnet, Litchfield, Minnesota, to Gregory S. Gross, 
Division of Water Quality, MPCA (Sept. 23, 1991) (copy on file with author). 
 48. Ebnet Letter 1, supra note 45. 
 49. Administrative Record, supra note 25, at 958–59. 
 50. Id. 
 51. “Excellent,” wrote one official.  Id. at 991. 
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So it was that on September 8, 2004, the word “Litchfield” 
made its first appearance in the Annandale/Maple Lake 
administrative record,52 and twenty days later the MPCA Citizens 
Board approved the cities’ permit.53  MPCA had not yet performed 
TMDL calculations to determine how much phosphorus was too 
much phosphorus in the North Fork of the Crow River or Lake 
Pepin,54 nor was anyone claiming that Litchfield’s reductions would 
be enough to clear up either of those waters.  Nevertheless, it 
determined that, because increases at Annandale/Maple Lake 
would be offset by the reductions that it had previously approved 
for Litchfield, the proposed plant would “not contribute to water 
quality standards violations in Lake Pepin.”55 Point/point offset 
trading had prevailed, and the permit issued. 
C. Challenging the Permit: The Meaning of “Cause or Contribute” 
MCEA challenged the permit in the Court of Appeals, arguing 
that the Federal regulation plainly prohibited MPCA from issuing 
the permit because the new facility’s 2200 pounds of phosphorus 
would “contribute” to the impairment of the Lake Pepin watershed, 
regardless of what was happening at Litchfield or elsewhere.56  On 
the other side, MPCA argued that although the new facility’s 
phosphorus might affect Lake Pepin’s watershed, overall there 
would be a significant net reduction once Litchfield was brought 
into the equation, such that the federal regulation’s “cause or 
contribute” prohibition was not triggered.57  The agency further 
argued that to read the regulation as simply barring all new 
phosphorus inputs without consideration of the larger picture 
would prevent cities from replacing older, dirtier facilities with 
newer, cleaner ones, thus frustrating the intent of the CWA.58 
Resolution of the parties’ arguments required the court to 
determine, as a threshold matter, what deference, if any, should be 
given to MPCA’s offset interpretation.  On this point, the panel was 
 52. Id. at  958. 
 53. Id. at 994. 
 54. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 510–11 (Minn. 2007). 
 55. Administrative Record, supra note 25, at 1038. 
 56. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 57. Id. at 774. 
 58. Id. at 775 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)). 
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divided between two seemingly conflicting lines of Minnesota 
Supreme Court authority. 
The majority invoked a line of authority that includes a case 
called Eller Media, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court stated 
that it retained “the authority to review de novo errors of law which 
arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words 
in a statute.”59  This line of authority seemed to suggest that, under 
Minnesota law, there was no such thing as deference on questions 
of legal interpretation.  The majority also approvingly cited a 
commentator’s observation that “when separate agencies 
promulgate and enforce regulations, deference to the enforcing 
agency improperly allows inconsistent interpretation of 
regulations,”60 the implication being that MPCA did not deserve 
deference for its interpretation of a regulation it did not 
promulgate.61 
Having approved this line of authority, the majority made its 
consideration essentially unnecessary by finding that “a plain 
reading” (that is, a reading not requiring any interpretation) of the 
federal regulation’s “cause or contribute” language supported 
MCEA’s arguments: 
A plain reading of the phrase “cause or contribute” . . . 
indicates that, so long as some level of discharge may be 
causally attributed to the impairment of Section 303(d) 
waters, a permit shall not be issued.  Here, the record 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the reduction in 
phosphorus resulting from other sources, the waters at 
issue remain impaired.  And the amount of phosphorus 
discharged into the North Fork from the proposed 
wastewater-treatment plant, which is more than double 
the current [amount discharged by Annandale and Maple 
Lake into the same watershed], will contribute to 
impaired nutrient levels in Lake Pepin.  We, therefore, 
conclude that the PCA erred as a matter of law when it 
issued a permit for the Cities’ proposed plant.62 
 59. In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for Outdoor Adver. Device 
Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 2003).  This part of Eller Media was cited with 
approval in the court of appeals’ decision.  In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 772. 
 60. In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 772 (citing 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.11 (4th ed. 2002)). 
 61. The court did not explain how de novo interpretation of a federal 
regulation by a state court would avoid inconsistent interpretations by other state 
and federal courts.  See In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 768–76. 
 62. Id. at 775. 
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The dissent based its analysis on an entirely different line of 
Minnesota agency deference cases, which extended deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes that the agencies were charged by 
law with administering.63  Based on this line of authority, the dissent 
argued that the phrase “cause or contribute” was not clear on its 
face, “as evidenced by the meritorious opposing constructions 
advanced by both parties,”64 and was “reasonably susceptible to 
different interpretations.”65  As such, the dissent argued, the court 
should have deferred to a reasonable and expert interpretation.66  
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the MPCA was required by 
federal and state statute to enforce the CWA “and its attendant 
regulations,” and that the MPCA therefore deserved deference 
even if it did not author the regulation.67 
D. Annandale in the Minnesota Supreme Court 
In its review, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced an especially 
difficult agency deference issue compounded by the existence of a 
seeming conflict in state case law.  In resolving these questions, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court used federal cases to bolster its own 
analysis in several ways. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining 
that the court of appeals erred when it concluded that a state 
agency’s interpretation of a federal regulation was not entitled to 
deference, noting that its holding in St. Otto’s Home v. Minnesota 
Department of Human Services,68 cited by the dissent below,69 provided 
guidance on this question.70  St. Otto’s Home discussed the deference 
owed to the state Department of Human Services’ interpretation of 
a regulation that it had promulgated, and concluded that courts 
should give considerable deference to a state agency’s construction 
of its “own regulation.”71 
 63. Id. at 777 (Schumacher, J., dissenting) (citing Krumm v. R. A. Nadeau 
Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn. 1979); In re Max Schwartzman & Sons, Inc., 670 
N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 776–77. 
 67. Id. at 777. 
 68. 437 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1989). 
 69. In re Annandale, 702 N.W.2d at 777 (Schumacher, J., dissenting). 
 70. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 512 (Minn. 2007). 
 71. St. Otto’s Home, 437 N.W.2d at 40. 
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At first blush, the key phrase “own regulation” would appear to 
distinguish Annandale, as the regulation in question was 
promulgated by the EPA, not the MPCA.  To meet this point, the 
court deployed federal case authority: 
[U]nlike the case before us, in St. Otto’s Home we were not 
required to decide whether an agency’s “own regulation” 
is limited to regulations promulgated by that agency or 
also includes regulations coming from another source 
that the agency is legally required to enforce and 
administer.  Yet, a United States Supreme Court case cited 
in St. Otto’s Home provides us with a reference point on 
this issue.72 
That federal case was Udall v. Tallman,73 a 1965 decision in 
which the United States Supreme Court noted that a federal 
agency’s interpretation of a federal statute was entitled to 
deference “when the administrative practice at stake ‘involves a 
contemporaneous construction of a statute by [those] charged with 
the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the 
parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and 
new.’”74  The Annandale court stated that it agreed with this 
reasoning and concluded that “an agency’s ‘own regulation’ may 
include a regulation that the agency is legally required to enforce 
and administer, even if the regulation was not promulgated by the 
agency.”75 
Based on the court’s brief quotation, one might conclude that 
Udall was about agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  In 
fact, the case concerned the Secretary of the Interior’s 
interpretation of presidential and administrative orders dealing 
with federal land management and leasing.76  It is all the more 
remarkable, then, that the Annandale court did not quote the next 
few lines from Udall: “[w]hen the construction of an administrative 
regulation rather than a statute is at issue, deference is even more 
clearly in order.”77  This portion of Udall would seem to be directly 
 72. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512. 
 73. 380 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 74. Id. at 16 (quoting Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & 
Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961)). 
 75. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512. 
 76. Udall, 380 U.S. at 2. 
 77. Id. at 16. 
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on point for the Annandale case.  So why didn’t the court go this 
extra distance to support its reasoning?78 
At this point in the opinion, the court sought to explain how 
the underlying justification for its broad interpretation of “own 
regulation” was consistent with the underlying justifications for 
deference.79  The court pointed to another of its own cases, In re 
Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota,80 in 
which the court stated that deference was “rooted in the separation 
of powers doctrine” and therefore “extended to an agency decision-
maker in the interpretation of statutes that the agency is charged 
with administering and enforcing.”81  The court explained that the 
separation of powers justification advanced in Blue Cross was not 
only consistent with Udall, but went “beyond” that case by holding 
that “when judicial deference—which is rooted in the separation of 
powers doctrine—is appropriate, it goes beyond deference to 
agency-created regulations and also includes statutes administered 
by the agency that the agency is charged with enforcing and 
administering.”82  It is not clear what the court meant by this, since 
Udall dealt with agency interpretation of presidential and 
administrative orders,83 while Blue Cross dealt with agency 
interpretation of statutes.84 What is clear, however, is that the 
Annandale court believed that both state and federal precedent 
supported its decision to interpret the “own regulation” rule of St. 
Otto’s Home as embracing regulations applied by an agency, even if 
not authored by that agency. 85 
The court’s other explicit references to federal case law dealt 
with an aspect of agency deference doctrine that is actually 
preliminary to the issues discussed above: Minnesota courts, like 
federal courts, state that they will not defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation when the regulation is 
 78. A possible answer is suggested below.  See infra Part IV. 
 79. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512. 
     80.     624 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2001). 
 81. Id. at 278. 
 82. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512. 
 83. Udall, 380 U.S. at 17 (identifying executive orders issued by the President 
and public land orders issued by the Secretary of the Interior). 
 84. Blue Cross, 624 N.W.2d at 273. 
 85. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512–13 (“Based on the foregoing case law, 
we conclude that when addressing whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation 
of a federal regulation, an initial factor courts must consider is whether the agency 
is charged with enforcing and administering the regulation such that the 
regulation can be characterized as the agency’s own regulation.”). 
5. KONAR-STEENBERG - ADC 6/3/2008  5:59:38 PM 
2008] IN RE ANNANDALE 1389 
 
unambiguous.  This was essentially the approach of the Annandale 
court of appeals majority.86  On this point, the court cited Resident 
v. Noot,87 a 1981 Minnesota Supreme Court case in which the court 
stated that it would not defer to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own regulation “when the language employed or the standards 
delineated are clear and capable of understanding.”88  The 
Annandale court stated that the approach in Noot “comport[ed] 
with the approach articulated by the [United States] Supreme 
Court,”89 and went on to cite Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,90 perhaps the most well-known agency 
deference case in American jurisprudence, and United States v. 
LaBonte,91 a more recent and less well-known case, both for the 
proposition that no deference would be paid to federal agency 
interpretations of unambiguous federal statutes.92 
The Annandale court used this rule in an interesting way to 
reconcile the two seemingly contradictory lines of Minnesota case 
law that divided the court of appeals.  As discussed above, one line 
of authority held that courts were to apply a de novo standard of 
review to questions of law, which the Annandale court of appeals 
majority interpreted to mean that legal questions were reserved to 
the court and no deference was owed; the other line of authority 
advocated by the dissent assumed that courts should defer to 
agencies on some questions of law.93 
In its brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court, MCEA pressed 
the majority’s line of authority, including Eller Media.94  In response 
to this argument, the court carefully characterized Eller Media as a 
case in which it had “apparently found no indication that the 
 86. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768, 774–75 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005), rev’d, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007). 
     87.    305 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 1981). 
 88. Id. at 312. 
 89. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 513. 
 90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 91. 520 U.S. 751 (1997). 
 92. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 513–14. 
 93. See generally In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit 
Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 702 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2005), rev’d, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007). 
 94. Brief for Respondent Minn. Center for Environmental. Advocacy at 34–
37, In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the 
Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007) (No. A04-2033), 
2005 WL 5488629 (citing In re Denial of Eller Media Co.'s Applications for 
Outdoor Adver. Device Permits, 664 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003)). 
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[statute] was ambiguous or that [the agency’s] training and 
expertise were required for its application.”95  This, of course, is a 
clear reference back to the court’s discussion of Noot, Chevron, and 
LaBonte.  Under this approach, the court reasoned, it was never 
called upon in Eller Media to defer to the agency’s interpretation, 
because the statute at issue there was unambiguous.96  Therefore, 
“Eller Media did not overrule or modify the analytical framework we 
previously established for determining when we defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.”97  The apparent 
conflict in Minnesota agency deference law was thus resolved. 
Having laid this groundwork with the aid of federal case law, 
the court restated the factors that it concluded would sustain 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation under 
Minnesota law and applied those factors to approve MPCA’s 
interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).  First, the court concluded 
that the EPA’s regulation was the MPCA’s “own regulation,” by 
virtue of the fact that MCPA was charged by state law with 
implementing the state’s NPDES program.98  Next, the court 
determined, after a long discussion of the CWA and related cases, 
that the regulation, especially the phrase “cause or contribute,” was 
ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.99  Finally, the court concluded that the MPCA’s 
approach to the regulation, which allowed for new sources of 
pollution so long as they could be offset by other recently approved 
reductions in pollution, was reasonable because it was “consistent 
with the purposes and principles” of the CWA.100 
One other type of federal authority played an interesting role 
in the court’s analysis.  In 2002, the EPA and the state of Arizona 
approved an NPDES permit for the Carlota Copper company to 
open a new open-pit copper mine adjacent to Pinto Creek, a water 
of the United States already impaired by mining pollution.101  The 
permit was approved by the EPA and Arizona on the condition that 
Carlota Copper reduce pollution flowing into Pinto Creek from 
 95. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 515. 
 96. Id. at 515–16. 
 97. Id. at 516. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 516–22. 
 100. Id. at 524. 
 101. Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A., 504 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
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one of its abandoned mines.102  Environmental groups challenged 
the permit’s offset feature, but in 2004 it was upheld by the 
Environmental Appeals Board, an arm of the EPA.103  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court pointed to this administrative 
adjudication as evidence that the interpretation of the federal 
regulation was “not a clear-cut issue where [it could] just give effect 
to an unambiguously expressed intent and therefore substitute [its] 
judgment for that of the MPCA.”104  Instead, the court reasoned, 
the regulation was clearly susceptible to multiple reasonable 
interpretations, one of which was the MPCA’s offset 
interpretation.105  Based on this reasoning, the court reversed the 
court of appeals and upheld the permit. 
III. CRITIQUING ANNANDALE 
Having outlined the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in this difficult case, this section ungallantly critiques it.  In 
particular, it seeks to show that contrary to the court’s claims to 
have acted consistently with federal agency deference doctrine, 
Annandale actually pushes Minnesota and federal doctrine further 
apart. 
The discussion begins by distilling Annandale’s specific claims 
to have comported with federal doctrine, followed by a short 
overview of that federal body of law.  This sets up the main critique, 
which is that Annandale departs from federal doctrine in at least 
three significant ways: (1) it authorizes strong deference for agency 
interpretations of ambiguous regulations authored by other 
agencies; (2) it draws no distinction between statutes and 
regulations for purposes of deference analysis; and (3) it deploys 
separation of powers as the justification for deference to 
administrative interpretation of regulations. 
A. Four Claims of Consistency with Federal Doctrine 
The discussion above illustrates several ways in which the court 
explicitly and implicitly claimed to have acted in accordance with 
federal agency deference doctrine: 
 102. Id. at 1010. 
 103. In re Carlota Copper Co., 11 E.A.D. 692 (2004). 
 104. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 522. 
 105. Id.  More will be said about this conclusion and its relation to Carlota 
Copper later in this article.  See infra Part IV. 
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• In its discussion of St. Otto’s Home and Udall, the court 
claimed that its decision to interpret the phrase “own 
regulation” expansively was consistent with United 
States Supreme Court precedent. 
 
• In its discussion of Blue Cross and Udall, the court 
strongly suggested that separation of powers is the 
common justification for state and federal deference 
doctrines applying to statutes and regulations. 
 
• In its discussion of Noot, Chevron, and LaBonte, the court 
asserted that Minnesota and federal case law are in 
agreement that no deference is to be afforded to 
unambiguous legal authorities. 
 
If one considers for a moment the nature of the cases used by 
the court to support these assertions, there is another, implicit 
claim: most of the federal and state cases cited in the court’s 
analysis involved agency interpretation of statutes, rather than 
regulations.  The interesting exception on the federal side is Udall, 
which involved an agency head’s interpretation of presidential 
orders as well as his own agency order.  But even there, the court 
was content to quote only that portion of Udall explaining the circa-
1946 federal deference rules applicable to statutes, and refrained 
from quoting the more obviously analogous portion of Udall 
addressing deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 
regulations.  The Annandale court’s willingness to rely on statute 
cases to resolve a regulation case thus seems to imply a fourth 
claim: 
 
• Throughout its discussion, the court implicitly claimed 
that neither state nor federal case law draws any 
relevant distinction between statutes and regulations 
for purposes of deference analysis. 
 
These four claims are tested against the federal framework 
outlined below. 
B. The Federal Framework 
Federal case law governing agency deference has evolved over 
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the years into a somewhat elaborate framework that provides for 
different strengths of agency deference depending on what kind of 
legal authority is being interpreted (i.e., interpretation of a statute 
versus interpretation of a regulation) and the means of 
interpretation (i.e., interpretation by means of a notice-and-
comment regulation versus an interpretation by means of an 
informal letter to a regulated party).  Figure 1 provides a simplified 
illustration of the federal framework; the discussion that follows 
fills in some of the details relevant to the critique of Annandale. 
 
Figure 1.  A Visual Guide to Federal  
Agency Deference Doctrine 
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The starting point for most discussions of federal agency 
deference (including this one) is the strong deference that federal 
courts tend to give to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 
commonly known as “Chevron deference,” after the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1984 decision.106  The Supreme Court has 
identified some of Chevron’s limits in recent years, but this much 
endures: when Congress leaves interpretive gaps in federal statutes, 
and assigns a federal agency the job of implementing that statute, 
federal courts will defer to reasonable agency interpretations 
contained in duly promulgated legislative regulations or decisions 
in formal (that is, trial-like) administrative adjudications.107 
Although Chevron deference is often thought to be justified by 
agency technical expertise,108 a better argument can be made that 
the actual justification lies in notions of separation of powers and 
political accountability.109  As the Court explains in a key passage, a 
statute might be written ambiguously because Congress wants the 
agency to use its technical expertise to fill in the gaps; or ambiguity 
might be the result of Congress’s inability to overcome some 
political impasse that is then punted to the agency; or ambiguity 
might simply be the result of a lack of foresight or even an outright 
mistake.110  “For judicial purposes,” the Court observed, “it matters 
not which of these things occurred.”111 
Instead, what matters is that Congress left an interpretive gap 
in a statute implemented by a federal agency.  Under Chevron, the 
existence of such a gap carries a strong implication that it is to be 
filled by a reasonable agency interpretation, and to allow unelected 
judges to second-guess the policy decisions of agency officials 
appointed by an elected President and delegated this power by an 
elected Congress would undermine the prerogatives of the political 
 106. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 107. Id. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: Examining When 
Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 
869, 881 (2007) (noting that “whether addressing a question of law or fact, an 
interpretive rule, or a legislative rule, the Supreme Court consistently cites agency 
expertise as a primary rationale for deferring to agency action”). 
 109. For an analysis of competing views about Chevron’s justifications, see Note, 
The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (2007). 
 110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
 111. Id. 
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branches.  As the Court put it, “[i]n such a case, federal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do.”112 
More recent cases have emphasized this connection between 
congressional intent and Chevron deference.  In United States v. 
Mead Corp.,113 the Court was asked to decide whether 
interpretations of statutes contained in tariff ruling letters, issued 
by the thousands each year by U.S. customs officials, qualified for 
Chevron deference.114  In declining to extend deference to these 
letters, the Court stated that Chevron deference was appropriate 
only for interpretations promulgated under a congressional grant 
of authority to make rules carrying the force of law.115  The Court 
identified legislative rules and formal adjudications as examples 
that meet this test and allowed that there might be other forms of 
agency action reflecting “comparable congressional intent” to 
confer upon agencies this kind of lawmaking authority.116  The 
Court also identified some forms of agency action that do not 
qualify, such as “policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines,” which the Court said were “beyond the 
Chevron pale.”117  Mead thus shows that for purposes of Chevron 
deference, the form of an agency interpretation is a critical 
consideration because form speaks to congressional intent and 
Chevron deference is about judicial respect for the intent of 
Congress—in a phrase, separation of powers. 
An entirely separate line of authority addresses the 
interpretation of ambiguous regulations.  This strong form of 
deference is known variously as Seminole Rock or Auer deference, 
and under this doctrine an agency’s interpretation of its own 
ambiguous rules will be upheld unless “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”118  Although both Chevron and 
Auer lead to strong deference, there are two important differences 
between the doctrines for our purposes.  First, whereas the 
 112. Id. at 866. 
   113.     533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 114. Id. at 221. 
 115. Id. at 226–27. 
 116. Id. at 227. 
 117. Id. at 234. 
 118. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).  This rule from Seminole Rock is also quoted in Udall 
v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965), deepening the mystery over why the 
Minnesota Supreme Court made such truncated use of that case. 
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justification for Chevron deference is fairly conceptual, Auer 
deference has been traditionally understood to be based on the 
more pragmatic consideration that the author of an ambiguous 
regulation is best positioned to explain it.119  Thus, separation of 
powers is not ordinarily understood to justify Auer deference, and 
for this reason is not strictly dependent on the form of the 
interpretation in the way that Chevron-after-Mead is.120 
There is a third form of deference at the federal level, known 
as Skidmore deference,121 which sometimes applies where the 
stronger forms do not.  In Mead, for example, after the Court 
declined to apply strong Chevron deference, it remanded to the 
lower courts for consideration of whether Skidmore deference might 
apply.122  This flavor of agency deference is both weaker and 
significantly looser in its application than Chevron deference: 
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions 
of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling 
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute 
a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.  The 
weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.123 
Expertise matters here, because expertise is a key factor in the 
persuasive power of an agency’s interpretation.124  Also, although 
 119. Thus, in Auer, the Court noted that to require an agency to narrowly 
construe its own regulations “would make little sense,” since the agency would be 
free to rewrite the regulations more broadly.  Auer, 519 U.S. at 463. 
   120.     See, e.g., Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429–30 (“We recognize that 
the Secretary had not taken a position on this question until this litigation.  
However, when it is the Secretary’s regulation that we are construing, and when 
there is no claim in this Court that the regulation violates any constitutional or 
statutory mandate, we are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for 
the Secretary’s unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s 
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the 
regulation’s promulgation.”). 
 121. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944). 
 122. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 234, 238–39 (2001). 
 123. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 124. Although at least one current justice views Skidmore as an “anachronism,” 
a majority would probably find that Skidmore deference persists.  See Kristin E. 
Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (2007) (“Justice Scalia, concurring in ARAMCO, called 
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this form of deference is weaker in the sense that it does not bind 
the reviewing court as tightly as Chevron deference, it is also less 
encumbered than Chevron deference or Auer deference by 
questions of form and authorship.  As the Mead Court’s remand 
suggests, Skidmore deference may apply to the interpretation of 
statutes or regulations contained in a host of interpretive devices 
“beyond the Chevron pale,” so long as the interpretation carries the 
requisite, if nebulous, “power to persuade.”125 
C. Critiquing Three Out of Four Claims 
Based on this discussion, it should be clear that of the four 
claims identified above, only one is noncontroversial: federal courts 
and Minnesota courts agree that if a statute or regulation is clear 
on its face, there is no issue of agency deference—the court applies 
the clear terms of the law.126  The remaining three claims are 
questionable. 
First, unlike Annandale’s approach, a federal court would be 
unlikely to extend strong deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
an ambiguous regulation authored by another agency.  Recall that 
Annandale took a broad view of the “own regulation” language from 
St. Otto’s Home, reasoning that “own regulation” might include 
regulations administered but not promulgated by the interpreting 
agency.127  This stands in contrast with the underlying justification 
of Auer deference, the obvious federal analogue.  As discussed 
above, Auer deference is premised on the notion that the 
promulgating agency knows best what its regulation means; the 
Skidmore deference ‘an anachronism’ in the post-Chevron era.”).  For a discussion 
of Skidmore in the post-Mead era, see Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: 
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 
(2004). 
 125. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 219–20. 
 126. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress . . . .”); In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS 
Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 
2007).  Of course, determining what is clear and what is ambiguous remains a 
challenge.  The Annandale dissenters, for example, would have held that the plain 
language of the federal regulation unambiguously prohibited the agency from 
issuing Annandale/Maple Lake an NPDES permit because the proposed facility’s 
extra 2200 pounds of phosphorus would clearly “contribute” to the violation of 
phosphorus water quality standards in Lake Pepin.  In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 
526 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 127. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512 (majority opinion). 
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corollary is that if the agency has not authored the regulation in 
question, that justification for strong deference disappears. 
By way of example, consider Martin v. OSHRC,128 in which the 
United States Supreme Court declined to defer to the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission’s (OSHRC) 
interpretation of regulations adopted by the Secretary of Labor, 
even though the Commission was charged by law with adjudicating 
disputes under those regulations.129  The Martin Court reasoned, 
for interpretive purposes, that those regulations belonged to the 
Secretary, not the Commission: “[b]ecause the Secretary 
promulgates these standards, the Secretary is in a better position 
than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the 
regulations in question.”130 
Here, then, is one potential explanation for the court’s 
mysterious selective quotation from Udall.131  Had the court gone 
beyond the material in Udall dealing with statutes, and had it 
discussed agency deference issues involving regulations, it would 
have also had to acknowledge the underlying authority cited by the 
Udall court—Seminole Rock, the precursor to Auer.132  That line of 
authority, in turn, is constrained by cases like Martin, which seem to 
undercut Annandale’s conclusion that an agency’s “own regulation” 
may include another agency’s regulation.133 
This brings us to the second difference between Annandale 
agency deference and the federal system of agency deference: by 
relying extensively on federal authority dealing with the rules of 
agency deference for statutes, Annandale seems to imply that there 
is no analytical difference in federal agency deference law between 
statutes and regulations.  However, in the federal system there are 
clearly two lines of authority—Chevron/Mead for statutes and Auer 
   128.    499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
 129. Id. at 152 (holding that the court owed no deference to the agency 
responsible for adjudications under regulations promulgated by another agency).  
For a contemporaneous overview of the issues in Martin, see Russell L. Weaver, 
Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991). 
 130. Martin, 499 U.S. at 152.  Recently, the United States Supreme Court 
suggested that expertise also matters for purposes of Seminole Rock deference.  See 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006).  However, there is no indication 
in Gonzales that the Court meant to extend Seminole Rock deference to rules 
adopted by other agencies.  See id. 
 131. See In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 512; supra Part II.D. 
 132. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). 
 133. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 152 (declining to defer where agency did not 
author regulations). 
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for regulations.  Both lines of authority contain their own 
freestanding justifications—separation of powers for Chevron/Mead 
and the more pragmatic author-knows-best reasoning of Seminole 
Rock/Auer.  Both also have their own internal rules and conditions.  
For example, Chevron/Mead is constrained by questions of 
interpretive form; Auer (so far as we know) is not.  None of these 
nuances make their way into the Annandale schema. 
The final difference, closely related to the prior point, is that a 
federal court would not be likely to invoke separation of powers in 
a case involving agency interpretation of a regulation rather than a 
statute.  As noted above, Chevron deference rests largely on 
separation of powers, and after Mead there is a particular focus on 
respect for legislative judgments about the role of the executive in 
carrying out policy.  This kind of legislative judgment is not really 
at issue in a case involving agency interpretation of a regulation, 
and even less so in a case like Annandale that involves a regulation 
promulgated by the federal government. 
To be fair, the court did cite a Minnesota statute that 
authorizes the agency to implement the state side of the NPDES 
permitting program and an MPCA regulation, noting the 
concurrent application of state and federal water pollution 
regulations.134  Based on these references, one might argue that 
deference here really was about separation of powers and respect 
for the Minnesota Legislature’s judgments.  Two points may be 
made in response.  First, the court did not cite these authorities as 
part of its separation of powers discussion; it cited them to try to 
show that the federal regulation was the MPCA’s “own 
regulation.”135  Second, it is hard to see how withholding deference 
to the MPCA’s interpretation of the federal regulation at issue 
would have constituted an affront to legislative judgments.  Unlike 
Chevron and other cases where a legislature’s own statute was the 
subject of interpretation, in this case the Minnesota Legislature’s 
only real involvement was to authorize the MPCA’s participation in 
a federal regulatory scheme.  The regulation itself was not 
authored by any arm of Minnesota government.  Under these 
circumstances, deference rules designed to show due respect to the 
intent of the legislative branch seem less compelling than the 
judiciary’s own constitutional role of ensuring that the law is 
 134. In re Annandale, 731 N.W.2d at 515–16. 
 135. Id. at 516. 
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obeyed.136 
Thus, despite the court’s explicit and implicit claims, there 
does not appear to be a great deal of overlap between Annandale 
deference and the federal deference framework.  The two models 
agree that if the statute or regulation is unambiguous, deference is 
not an issue.  But beyond that there is considerable disconnect 
between the two approaches.  The implications of this disconnect 
are addressed in the concluding section below. 
IV. CONCLUSION: SOME POST-ANNANDALE DEVELOPMENTS AND 
THOUGHTS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
Whether consistent with federal law or not, Annandale is likely 
to be the touchstone for agency deference issues in Minnesota 
courts for the foreseeable future.  This concluding section briefly 
touches on questions of what might have been, and what might 
come next. 
A. What Might Have Been: Carlota Copper Revisited 
As noted above, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis 
rested in part on the EPA’s own use of what amounted to an offset 
in the Carlota Copper matter.137  That matter did not end when the 
appeals board affirmed the permit, however.  About the time that 
the Annandale/Maple Lake NPDES permit was being challenged 
in Minnesota courts, Carlota Copper’s NPDES permit was being 
litigated in the Ninth Circuit.  And less than four months after 
Annandale approved MPCA’s offset scheme under 40 C.F.R. § 
122.4(i), the Ninth Circuit ruled the Carlota Copper permit’s offset 
to be illegal under that same regulation: 
The plain language of the first sentence of the regulation 
is very clear that no permit may be issued to a new 
discharger if the discharge will contribute to the violation 
of water quality standards. . . .  The EPA contends that the 
partial remediation of the discharge from the Gibson 
Mine will offset the pollution.  However, there is nothing 
in the Clean Water Act or the regulation that provides an 
 136. The Annandale dissent makes a similar point.  Id. at 527 (Page, J., 
dissenting).  In fact, it may be that the real constitutional value at stake in 
Annandale was not so much separation of powers as it was the proper distribution 
of power between state and federal governments—in a word, federalism. 
 137. See Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. E.P.A., 504 F.3d 1007, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 
2007); supra Part II.D. 
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exception for an offset when the waters remain impaired 
and the new source is discharging pollution into that 
impaired water.138 
The tantalizing question, of course, is whether Annandale 
would have come out differently had Carlota Copper been decided 
first.  Would the Minnesota Supreme Court have adopted this 
federal appeals court interpretation of the federal regulation at 
issue?  Or would it still have gone ahead with the view that the 
regulation is ambiguous and the MPCA’s offset solution was 
reasonable?  For what it may be worth, MCEA asked the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to stay its deadline for requesting rehearing until 
after the Ninth Circuit had a chance to rule, even offering to forgo 
rehearing if the Ninth Circuit ended up agreeing with the offset 
approach.139  The court denied that motion.140 
B. What Next? Some Thoughts for the Practitioner 
Annandale is a mixed bag of clarifications and new questions.  
On the clarity side, we now know that practitioners are unlikely to 
get far in arguing that the court should always apply a pure de novo 
standard under Eller Media.  Instead, Annandale sets up a three-step 
deference analysis that requires the court to ask: 
 
(1) Is the regulation ambiguous?  (If not, there is no 
question of deference as the court applies the plain 
meaning of the regulation.) 
 
(2) If so, is it the interpreting agency’s own regulation?  (If 
not, it is unclear what happens; the court will probably 
apply a de novo standard, although practitioners might 
attempt to make a Skidmore-esque argument here for 
partial deference.) 
 
(3) If the ambiguous regulation is the interpreting 
 138. Pinto Creek, 504 F.3d at 1012. 
 139. Notice of Motion & Motion for Extension of Time to Request Rehearing 
and Memorandum, In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit 
Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007) 
(No. A04-2033). 
 140. Order on Request for Contested Case Hearing, In re Cities of Annandale 
& Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated 
Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 2007) (No. A04-2033). 
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agency’s own regulation, is the interpretation 
reasonable? 
 
Second, practitioners with federal experience may find this 
analysis comfortably familiar, because it is basically Chevron without 
the messy questions of form raised by Mead.141  Although the court 
hasn’t yet directly addressed whether this framework will apply to 
deference issues involving statutes rather than regulations, the 
answer seems likely to be yes, given the court’s willingness in 
Annandale to lump statutes and regulations together in its 
deference reasoning.  If Annandale signals the beginning of a kind 
of “regime change” in Minnesota law that will see this Chevron-type 
analysis applied to the range of agency deference issues, as one 
commentator has suggested,142 then practitioners should be able to 
take advantage of some of the insights of those who have lived with 
Chevron for years.  For example, one study of Chevron cases showed 
that agencies prevailed nearly 90% of the time on the question of 
whether their interpretation was reasonable.143  Armed with this 
knowledge, it may be wise for advocates to treat the threshold 
question of whether the regulation is ambiguous as virtually 
outcome determinative.144 
On the other hand, some things are less clear after Annandale.  
In particular, those accustomed to using federal cases as persuasive 
authority may find it harder to predict what kinds of federal cases 
are going to be persuasive.  For example, on the question of “own 
regulation,” proponents of deference will probably want to avoid 
federal cases that lead to Auer and Martin, even though those cases 
are instinctively the most analogous as they deal with agency 
deference issues pertaining to regulations and not statutes. 
There is something else that practitioners may want to pay 
close attention to in the coming years.  In setting forth its 
restatement of agency deference law as it pertains to regulations, 
 141. For one of many critiques of Mead, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead 
Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005). 
 142. David Schultz, Administrative Law: The Year in Review, Continuing Legal 
Education Presentation for the Minnesota State Bar Association (June 20, 2007). 
 143. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of 
the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,” 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) 
(examining Chevron cases in the federal circuit courts in 1995 and 1996). 
 144. For a general discussion of Chevron’s acceptance among state courts, see 
William R. Andersen, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1017 (2006). 
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the Annandale court installed an escape valve: 
When a court concludes that the language of the agency’s 
regulation is unclear and susceptible to different 
reasonable interpretations and that the agency’s 
interpretation of the regulation is reasonable, then the 
court will generally defer to the agency’s interpretation.145 
The court did not explain what circumstances might result in 
the court deviating from what turns out to be only a general rule.  
But it does seem clear that whatever bows to agency authority the 
opinion may make, the court retains ample power to deviate from 
deference should the need, in its sole discretion, arise. 
The court, in short, is still in charge. 
 
 145. In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance for 
the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
